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Devolving Standards of Decency:*
Using the Death Penalty to Punish
Child Rapists
I. Introduction
Not since 1964 has any person been executed in the United
States for the crime of rape.' If the State of Louisiana gets its
way, that statistic will soon be but a memory, and child rapists will
once again reside on death row.
In 1995, the Louisiana State Legislature amended the state's
rape law to allow prosecutors to seek the death penalty against
anyone found guilty of raping a child under the age of twelve.2 At
least twelve men stand accused under the law, but to date none
have been sentenced to death. Although Louisiana is presently
the only state that has such a law in effect,4 it is not the first state
to attempt such a law.5 In Georgia, the lower house passed a bill
authorizing the death penalty for anyone convicted of raping a
child under age twelve.6 In Montana, a state senator introduced
death penalty legislation authorizing the death penalty for second
* Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
1. See Michael Higgins, Is Capital Punishment for Killers Only?, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1997,
at 30. Higgins characterized using the death penalty to punish child rape as an example of
"devolving" standards of decency. See id.
2. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(c) (West 1996).
3. See Richard Willing, Expansion of Death Penalty to Nonmurderers Faces Challenges,
U.S.A. TODAY, May 14, 1997, at 6A.
4. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1068 (La. 1996), reh'g denied, NO. 96-KA-2073,
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
5. Between 1972 and 1989, Florida, Mississippi and Tennessee passed laws authorizing
capital punishment for child rapists. Each of these laws was subsequently invalidated. See
Buford v. State, 403 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Leatherwood
v. State, 548 So.2d 389 (Miss. 1989); Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977).
6. See John 0. Barrett, Death for Child Rapists May Not Save Children, THE NAT'L
L.J. Aug. 18, 1997, at A21. The bill was defeated in the Georgia State Senate, but State
Representative Warren Massey plans to reintroduce it again during the next session of the
General Assembly. See Kathy Scruggs, Ruling on Sexual Predators: State May be Able to
Commit Offenders, THE ATLANTA J.-THE ATLANTA CONST., June 28, 1997, at D5.
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convictions of rape involving serious bodily injury.7 In Pennsylva-
nia, the Republican Party sought death penalty legislation for
repeat sexual assaults on children.8
The United States Supreme Court has already addressed the
issue of punishing rapists with the death penalty.9 In 1977, the
Court held that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment prevents states from using the death penalty as
punishment for rape. 10 In that case, the victim was an adult.1
The Louisiana State Legislature decided that the rape of a child is
a different crime than the rape of an adult and, therefore, deserving
of a harsher punishment. 2
In 1996, two men indicted under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:42-
(c)' 3 challenged the constitutionality of the statute in the state's
highest court. 14  The first man, Anthony Wilson, was charged by
grand jury indictment with the aggravated rape of a five year old
girl. 5 Wilson moved to quash the indictment on the grounds that
the statute, by allowing the use of the death penalty as punishment
for rape, was unconstitutional. 16  The trial court agreed with
Wilson and granted the motion to quash.
17
The second challenger, Patrick Bethley, was charged with
raping three girls, ages five, seven, and nine, between December 1,
7. See Barrett, supra note 6, at A21.
8. See id.
9. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
10. See id. at 600.
11. See id. In Coker, the Court referred to the rape of an "adult woman" twelve times
in the opinion. See id. However, this comment will argue that the reasoning employed in
Coker should apply to the case of a child rapist as well.
12. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 14:42(c) (West 1996) (authorizing the death penalty for
the rape of a child under the age of twelve). This statute has been upheld by the Louisiana
State Supreme Court. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996), reh'g denied, NO. 96-
KA-2073, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
13. The section states:
Whoever commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by life imprison-
ment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
However, if the victim was under the age of twelve years, as provided by Paragraph
A(4) of this section, the offender shall be punished by death or life imprisonment
at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, in
accordance with the determination of the jury.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(c) (emphasis added) (hereinafter "Section 14:42(c)").
14. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1064.
15. See id. at 1064-65.
16. See id. at 1065.
17. See id.
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1995, and January 10, 1996.18 Bethley moved to quash the
indictment on the grounds that the statute is unconstitutional and
the trial court granted the motion.19
The state appealed both motions to the state supreme court.20
The Louisiana justices voted 3-2 that the law did not violate the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.2' Bethley
and Wilson moved for a rehearing, but it was denied.22 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
decision in 1997.23 Bethley and Wilson appealed the decision to
the United States Supreme Court, but the Court denied certiora-
ri.24 In an opinion accompanying the denial of certiorari, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, wrote that the
Court's denial was based on the "jurisdictional bar" to review-the
men had not been convicted and sentenced to death-and was not
based on the merits of the case.25 Therefore, the Court's decision
not to review the case was not an approval of the law.
2 6
This case presents a crossroads issue. The death penalty is the
most severe punishment in our criminal justice system. Typically,
it is reserved for only the most heinous crimes. Consequently, the
Supreme Court has never affirmed a death sentence in a case that
did not involve murder.27 If the Supreme Court upholds the
Louisiana statute, it could create a slippery slope in death penalty
legislation, eventually leading to the use of the death penalty for
significantly less serious crimes.'
18. See id.
19. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1065.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 1063.
22. See State v. Wilson, NO. 96-KA-2073 (1996).
23. See U.S. v. Bethley, 114 F.3d 1183 (5th Cir. 1997).
24. See Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 921 (1987);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
28. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 30. Several states have death penalty laws for crimes
not involving murder. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-51-20 (Michie 1997) (authorizing the death
penalty for the crime of treason); CAL. PENAL CODE § 37 (West 1985) (authorizing the death
penalty for the crime of treason); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-301 (West 1986)
(authorizing the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping when the victim is harmed); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.142 (West 1996) (authorizing the death penalty for the crime of drug
trafficking); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-1 (1996) (authorizing the death penalty for the crime
of treason); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/30-1 (West 1996) (authorizing the death penalty for
the crime of treason); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-7-67 (1996) (authorizing the death penalty for
1998]
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This comment analyzes the constitutionality of Section
14:42(c). First, this comment examines the history of the Eighth
Amendment and modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Second, this comment looks at case law on the death penalty as
applied to non-homicide cases, including those involving rape.
29
Finally, this comment analyzes the constitutionality of the death
penalty for child rapists by examining the legislative history of
Section 14:42(c) and the Louisiana State Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Wilson.3°
II. The Eighth Amendment
A. History
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
bans the use of cruel and unusual punishment.3' The phrase
"cruel and unusual punishment" was taken from the English
Declaration of Rights of 1688, but the principle can be traced as far
back as the Magna Carta.32 The English version of the phrase
appeared to have prohibited punishments that were unauthorized
by statute, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and disproportion-
ate to the crime committed.33 The Drafters of the United States
Constitution were more concerned with banning tortures and other
"barbarous" punishments such as pillorying, decapitation, and
the crime of treason); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-12-42 (Michie 1996) (authorizing the death
penalty for the crime of espionage); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.82.010 (West 1996) (autho-
rizing the death penalty for the crime of treason). However, today there is no one on death
row who was convicted and sentenced under any one of these statutes. See Higgins, supra
note 1, at 30. For all practical purposes, they have been invalidated by non-use.
29. This section of the comment focuses on the following cases: Tison, 481 U.S. 137, and
Enmund, 458 U.S. 782, for felony murder; Coker, 433 U.S. 584, and Buford v. State, 403
So.2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982), for rape.
30. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996), reh'g denied, NO. 96-KA-2073, cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
32. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); see also RAOUL BERGER, DEATH
PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 30. ("A free man shall not be
amerced for a trivial offence, except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for
a serious offence he shall be amerced according to its gravity.") Amercements were
compensation for injuries along the lines of retributive punishment. See id.
33. See Andrew H. Mun, Mandatory Life Sentence Without Parole Found Constitu-
tionally Permissible for Cocaine Possession, 67 WASH. L. REV. 713, 714 (1992); see also
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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drawing and quartering. 4 However, because those practices had
become obsolete, the Eighth Amendment went virtually ignored by
American courts until the 19th Century.
35
In 1910, the Supreme Court recognized that the Eighth
Amendment included protection against disproportionately
excessive sentences in Weems v. United States.36 In Weems, the
Court considered a Philippine statute prescribing a fine and
imprisonment in irons from twelve to twenty years for entry of a
known false statement in a public record.37 The Court held the
statute to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment because in comparison to the
punishments imposed for more serious crimes, this punishment was
excessive for the crime charged. 38 This decision marked the first
time the Supreme Court looked at the severity of the penalty in
relation to the crime instead of just considering the method of
punishment.39
B. Modern Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The definition of cruel and unusual punishment has grown and
evolved over time.4' Modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
began with the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Furman v.
Georgia.41 In Furman, the Court invalidated death penalty laws
across the country on the ground that the laws violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.42
In the per curium decision, the Court stressed the discriminatory
aspects of the sentencing structures then imposed and the broad
34. See Mun, supra note 33, at 714.
35. See id.; see also Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1065.
36. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
37. See id. at 358.
38. See id.
39. See M. GLEN ABERNATHY & BARBARA A. PERRY, CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION 147 (1993).
40. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 30. In the early days of the republic, states punished
many felonies with the death penalty. See id. Over time, the use of the death penalty has
become much more restricted and narrow; currently, there is no one on death row for a
crime not involving murder. See id.
41. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
42. See id. at 239-240. In Furman, the Court did not declare the death penalty to be per
se unconstitutional. See id. The Court addressed only the death penalty as then imposed.
See id.
19981
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discretion given to juries in determining when to impose the death
penalty.43
Following the Furman decision, states immediately began
revising their capital punishment laws to meet the objections
addressed in Furman." In 1976, the Supreme Court revisited the
issue, reviewing the revised statutes of five states: Georgia, Texas,
North Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida. 5 The Court invalidated
the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes because they mandated
the death penalty and, thus, provided no latitude for discretion by
the jury.' The Court upheld the death penalty statutes in
Georgia, Florida, and Texas because those states had properly
controlled the sentencing discretion of juries by requiring the
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, and had
narrowed the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.
7
Today, in determining whether the death penalty is a violation
of the Eighth Amendment, the Court considers the following
factors: (1) whether there is a risk that the death penalty will be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner;" and (2) whether
the punishment is cruel and unusual in that it makes no contribu-
tion to acceptable goals of punishment or is excessive.49
43. The five justices comprising the majority each filed a separate opinion, but all agreed
that "the penalty of death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a
substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (summarizing the holding in Furman).
44. See ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note 39, at 149. Following Furman, thirty-five
states passed new death penalty legislation. See id. Those thirty-five states were Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
and Wyoming. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1976).
45. See ABERNATHY & PERRY, supra note 40, at 149.
46. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976). Mandatory death penalty statutes do not allow for appropriate differentiation
between the culpability of different persons convicted of the same crime. See Woodson, 428
U.S. at 295.
47. See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976).
48. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 ("Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty,
Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a
substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."); see also
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1982) (explaining that one of the "twin
objectives" of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is "consistent and principled" application).
49. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977)) (arguing that death as a punishment is excessive when it is "grossly out of
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1. Arbitrary and Capricious Application-Although a
sentencing body is given the discretion to determine whether a
person should be put to death, that discretion "must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action."5  Therefore, a state must implement
procedures that (1) serve to narrow the class of death penalty
eligible persons: and (2) provide guidance to sentencing bodies.51
There are two ways in which a legislature can narrow the class of
death penalty eligible persons.5 2  The first is by narrowing the
definition of capital offenses.53 The second is by broadly defining
the capital offenses and then requiring that the jury find aggravat-
ing circumstances at the penalty phase before imposing the death
penalty.4 However, the aggravating circumstances must genuinely
narrow the eligible class and reasonably justify giving the defendant
a harsher punishment as compared to others found guilty of the
same crime.55
In order to effectively guide the discretion of sentencing
bodies, the state must provide clear and objective standards for
applying the death penalty.56 This requirement is best satisfied by
a system that utilizes a bifurcated proceeding.57 A bifurcated
proceeding separates the fact finding and sentencing phases of the
trial." This proceeding allows the court to explain clearly to the
proportion to the severity of the crime" or "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment").
50. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
51. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1070-71 (La. 1996), reh'g denied, NO. 96-KA-
2073, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07. The Court held
that Georgia's capital sentencing scheme did not create a risk of arbitrary and capricious
application. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
52. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988).
53. See id. at 244.
54. See id. At the penalty phase, the jury will be required to determine if there are any
aggravating circumstances that make the defendant deserving of a harsher punishment. See
Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 813 (1979). At this time, the defendant is allowed to
introduce mitigating evidence with the hope of receiving a more lenient sentence. See Penry,
492 U.S. at 315.
55. See Zant v. Stevens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
56. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).




sentencing body what its role is, what the guidelines for decision-
making are, and what information is relevant to the sentence.59
After the Furman decision, Georgia revised its capital
sentencing scheme.' The Supreme Court approved the revisions
because Georgia had (1) provided for a bifurcated proceeding; (2)
required the jury to find at least one aggravating circumstance
before imposing capital punishment; and (3) established automatic
appeal to and review by the state supreme court.61 The Court
cautioned that the presence of these procedures is not a guaranty
of constitutionality and insisted that the procedures of each state
must be individually analyzed.62  Nevertheless, the Georgia
sentencing scheme serves as a good measure against which to
evaluate other states' procedures.
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment-The second part of the
Eighth Amendment analysis addresses whether the punishment is
cruel and unusual.6 3 The death penalty is a cruel and unusual
punishment if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to accept-
able goals of punishment, or (2) is excessive in that it is contrary to
contemporary standards of decency or is grossly disproportionate
to the severity of the crime.'
a. Acceptable Goals of Punishment-The Supreme Court has
identified two legitimate goals of punishment: retribution and
deterrence.65 Retribution through criminal sanctions is an accept-
able goal of punishment because our society does not permit self-
help.6 Capital punishment is, in a sense, an expression of societal
outrage caused by certain types of conduct, and is essential in a
society whose citizens must rely on legal processes rather than on
59. See id. at 190-91. One problem with not having non-bifurcated proceeding is that
much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision has little or no relevance
to the determination of guilt. See id. Therefore, experts suggest that a bifurcated
proceeding, in which guilt and the sentence are considered at different phases, is the best
answer to this problem. See id.; see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 328 ("Rather than creating the
risk of an unguided emotional response, full consideration of evidence that mitigates against
the death penalty is essential if the jury is to give a 'reasonable moral response to the defen-
dant's background, character, and crime.'").
60. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 328.
61. See Gregg, 428 U.S at 206.
62. See id. at 195.
63. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335.
64. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
65. See id. at 183.
66. See id.
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self-help.67 However, in order to serve acceptable retributive
goals, the sentence must be directly related to the defendant's
individual culpability.68 The idea that more severe punishments
should be meted out to the criminals who act with the most
criminal intent is deeply entrenched in our legal tradition.69
The second acceptable goal of punishment is deterrence.7" If
the authorization of the death penalty deters future criminal acts,
then the punishment is contributing to that goal. In Gregg v.
Georgia,71 the Court acknowledged that the evidence of the
deterrent value of punishments is inconclusive.72 However, the
Court decided to leave this judgment up to the state legislators who
are in a better position to evaluate the conditions of their respec-
tive states and to adapt their laws accordingly.73  If the legislature
believes that the statute has a deterrent effect, the Court will most
likely uphold it unless it fails some other portion of the constitu-
tionality analysis.
74
b. Excessive Punishment-The second part of the cruel and
unusual analysis looks at whether the punishment is excessive.75
A punishment is excessive, and therefore unconstitutional, if it is
(1) contrary to contemporary standards of decency or (2) grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime.76
In applying the Eighth Amendment, the Court has stated that
"the Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."77 Therefore, the Eighth Amendment requires a court to
make an assessment of contemporary values concerning the
67. See id.
68. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1986), reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 921 (1987);
see also State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 651 (Utah 1997) ("The theory of retributive justice
is a theory of just deserts, and some notion that the punishment should fit the crime is
inherent in that theory."). See generally California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
69. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 168.
70. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
71. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
72. See id. at 185-86.
73. See id. at 186.
74. See id. at 187.
75. See id. at 175. But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989), reh'g denied,
492 U.S. 937 (1989) (arguing that the proportionality analysis should not be a determinative
factor when deciding if a given use of the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment).
76. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
77. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
1998]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:3
infliction of a challenged punishment.78 This assessment is not a
subjective judgment by the court.79 Rather, it requires an exami-
nation of objective evidence that reflects the public's attitude
toward a punishment.' The Supreme Court has said that "[t]he
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."81
Legislators are elected by the people. In a democratic society it is
the legislators, and not the courts, that respond to and reflect the
will of the people.8 Therefore, a court may look to the judgment
of the state's legislators as objective evidence of society's atti-
tudes.83
The willingness of the other states to enact similar legislation
is another form of evidence the court may consider.' 4 In Gregg,
the Court determined that there was a national consensus in favor
of the death penalty because thirty-five states had capital punish-
ment statutes. 85 The Court also looked at what other states have
declined to do.86 On the question of the death penalty for the
rape of an adult woman, for example, the Court found it determi-
native that of the sixteen states prior to Furman that had autho-
78. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 172; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277 (1972)
(per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("A third principle inherent in the [Eighth Amend-
ment] is that a severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society.").
79. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[Wie must make certain that the judicial determination is as objective as
possible.").
80. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
81. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). Some commentators would have the
Court look at international standards of decency in this evaluation as well. There is some
disagreement as to the value of international practices as indicia of contemporary standards
of decency. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that one way to expand the range of the
Court's analysis of the contemporary standard of decency is to examine international
standards. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831
n.31 (1987) (recognizing the relevance of the views of the international community in deter-
mining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual). But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 369 n.1 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989) (arguing that it is American
conceptions of decency that are dispositive).
82. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 179-182; see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-35; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-23;
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-93 (1977).
85. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171-73.
86. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 584.
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rized the death penalty for convicted rapists, only three chose to re-
implement them after Furman.87
Finally, in analyzing whether the punishment is contrary to
contemporary standards of decency, the Court may also consider
the willingness of juries to impose the death penalty for the crime
in question." Juries do not have the authority that legislators
have by nature of the fact that legislators were elected into office
to represent the people. However, juries are a good source to
consider because they are personally involved in the process.8 9
While contemporary standards of decency are an important
part of the cruel and unusual analysis, they are not conclusive.
90
The court must also consider the basic dignity of man, a fundamen-
tal principle underlying the Eighth Amendment.91 Therefore, the
legislature is not required to select the least severe penalty possible
so long as the penalty is not "cruelly inhumane or disproportionate
to the crime involved.,
92
This proportionality requirement is based on the theory of
retributive punishment.93  "[P]roportionality requires a nexus
between the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthi-
ness .... "9' The court must consider the defendant's personal
moral culpability and determine whether the proposed punishment
comports with the defendant's blameworthiness or is grossly
disproportionate.95
87. See id. at 594 (arguing that there is no national consensus for the use of the death
penalty to punish rape).
88. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 331; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982); Coker,
433 U.S. at 596; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181. However, this analysis does not apply to § 14:42(c)
because no defendant has been sentenced by a jury yet. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 30.
89. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 ("The jury also is a significant and reliable objective
index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.").
90. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); see also Coker, 433 U.S. at 597
("These recent events evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do
not wholly determine this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end [the
Court's] judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment.").
91. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
92. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175; see also Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788 ("[t]he Eighth Amendment
is directed, in part, against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are
grossly disproportionate to the offenses charged."); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 ("[A] punishment
is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it ... is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime.").
93. See Leatherwood v. State, 548 So.2d 389, 405 (Miss. 1989).
94. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J. concurring); see also
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
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III. The Death Penalty and Non-homicide Cases
Since Furman, the Supreme Court has not upheld a death
penalty sentence when the crime charged did not result in death.96
In Gregg, the Court determined that the death penalty is not
unconstitutional per se,97 but specifically declined to address the
question of whether capital punishment is unconstitutional when no
life is taken in the commission of the crime.98
Since Gregg, the Supreme Court has had three opportunities
to consider the constitutionality of imposing a death sentence on a
defendant who did not kill.99 Two of those cases involved felony
murderers who were sentenced to death but were not physically
responsible for the victim's death.' 0 The third case involved a
defendant who was convicted of rape and sentenced to death.01'
A. Felony Murder
In Enmund v. Florida, 2 the defendant was the driver of the
getaway car for an accomplice who had robbed and shot two
people. 3 Enmund did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend for a
killing to occur."° The Court held the death penalty was a
disproportionate punishment because the defendant's participation
in the murders was so minor and the sentence would not serve as
a deterrent for one who does not kill and has no intention of
killing.0 5
Five years later the Court considered the subject again in
Tison v. Arizona."°6 Tison differed from Enmund in that the
defendant played a much larger role in the murder and the Arizona
Supreme Court found that the defendant contemplated or anticipat-
ed that lethal force would be used or that life would or might be
96. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 921 (1987);
Enmund, 458 U.S. 782; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
97. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-87.
98. See id. at 187 n.35.
99. See Tison, 481 U.S. 137; Enmund, 458 U.S. 782; Coker, 433 U.S. 584.
100. See Tison, 481 U.S. 137; Enmund, 458 U.S. 782.
101. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
102. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
103. See id. at 784-85.
104. See id. at 798.
105. See id. at 801.
106. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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taken. °7 The Supreme Court vacated the sentence (insert what
sentence) and remanded the case for a determination of the
defendant's mental state according to the standards the Court
established.0 8 The Court did indicate in dicta, however, that the
Eighth Amendment would not automatically foreclose the use of
the death penalty for felony murder, but the prosecutor would have
to demonstrate major participation by the defendant in a felony
combined with a reckless indifference to human life.'0 9
B. Rape
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute that authorized use of the death penalty as a
punishment for rape in Coker v. Georgia."° The Court held that
the statute was unconstitutional because the punishment did not
comport with contemporary standards of decency and that death is
a grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime
of rape.' The victim in the case, however, was an adult woman,
and throughout the opinion the Court refers to the "rape of an
adult woman."' 12
First, the Court considered the contemporary standards of
decency as evinced by the legislatures across the country.13 The
Court determined that while the evidence was not wholly one-
sided, the weight of the legislative activity was on the side of
rejecting capital punishment as a punishment for rape.
14
Prior to 1972 when the Court invalidated death penalty laws
across the country, sixteen states plus the federal government had
statutes that authorized the death penalty for the rape of an adult
107. See id. at 158 ("Far from merely sitting in a car away from the actual scene of the
murders acting as the getaway driver to a robbery, [Tison] was actively involved in every
element of the kidnapping-robbery and was physically present during the entire sequence of
criminal activity culminating in the murder of the [victims] and the subsequent flight.").
108. See id. at 150-51. In Enmund, the Court specifically discussed two categories of
felony murderers: (1) those who have minor involvement in the murder and no intent to kill;
and (2) those who actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. See Enmund, 458
U.S. at 799. The Court did not foreclose the use of the death penalty for defendants in the
second category. See id.
109. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.
110. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
111. See id. at 592. The Court did not address the question of whether the statute
created a risk of arbitrary and carpricious application of the death penalty. See id. at 591.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 592-96.
114. See id. at 596.
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woman.1 1 5  After the Furman decision, thirty-five states re-
instituted death penalty statutes. 16 Three of those states included
rape of an adult as one of the eligible offenses, and three states
included child rape as an eligible offense.' 17  Georgia, North
Carolina, and Louisiana authorized the death penalty for rape of
an adult woman." 8 The Louisiana and North Carolina statutes
were invalidated because they mandated the death penalty for
those convicted."9 Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee were the
only states to include the rape of a child as a capital offense, and
Tennessee's law was invalidated in 1977 because it made the death
penalty mandatory.2 °  Therefore, at the time of the Coker
decision, only two states authorized the death penalty when the
rape victim was a child and only Georgia authorized death when
the rape victim was an adult.'2'
Second, the Court also looked to the sentencing decisions of
juries in Georgia as further evidence of contemporary standards of
decency.22 Since 1973, Georgia juries had sentenced only six
rapists to death. 2 At least nine times out of ten, Georgia juries
chose not to impose the death penalty for the crime of rape.24
Third, the Court determined that the punishment was grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime.'2 5 Rape is a highly
reprehensible crime-"[s]hort of homicide, it is the 'ultimate
violation of self."" 26  The Court also acknowledged that rape is
a violent crime, usually involving force and intimidation, and is
often accompanied by physical and emotional injury to the
115. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 593. Those sixteen states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See id. at n.6.
116. See id. at 593-94.
117. See id. at 594.
118. See id. See also Higgins, supra note 1, at 30.
119. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 332-33 (1976). When Louisiana and North Carolina revised their death penalty
statutes after these decisions, they did not include rape as a capital offense. See Coker, 433
U.S. at 594.
120. See Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1977).
121. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 596.
122. See id. at 596-97.
123. See id. at 596.
124. See id. at 597. This number is based only on those cases that were reviewed by the
Georgia Supreme Court. See id.
125. See id. at 597-600.
126. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
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victim."' The Court, however, determined that "in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,
[rape] does not compare with murder, which does involve the
unjustified taking of human life., 128  There is a basic difference
in the harm produced by rape and murder-the rape victim's life
continues, the murder victim's does not.
129
After Coker, only two states, Florida and Mississippi, autho-
rized capital punishment for the rape of a child. 3° The Florida
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the death penalty
is a cruel and unusual punishment for the rape of a child in Buford
v. State.1 31  The court held that, although in Coker the Supreme
Court addressed the crime of rape of an adult woman, the
reasoning stated in the opinion "compels" a decision that capital
punishment is an unconstitutionally excessive and disproportionate
punishment for the crime of sexual assault of a child as well.132
In 1989, the Mississippi Supreme Court was faced with a case
similar to Buford.133 The court, however, held that it did not
have to rule on the constitutionality of the statute because another
Mississippi statute precluded the imposition of the death penalty
when a life was not taken.1"4
127. See id. at 597-98.
128. Id. at 598. But see Coker, 433 U.S. at 621-22 (Burger, J., dissenting) (arguing that
rape is not so far removed from murder in terms of the "degree of heinousness" of the crime
as the majority would indicate and that the appropriateness of the use of the death penalty
to punish rape should be left to the legislators to decide).
129. See id. at 598.
130. See Leatherwood v. State, 548 So.2d 389, 404 (Miss. 1989).
131. 403 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1981). See generally FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (West 1998) (authorizing the death penalty for persons eighteen
years or older who committed sexual battery upon a person eleven years of age or younger).
132. See Buford, 403 So.2d at 951.
133. Leatherwood, 548 So.2d 389.
134. See id. at 402. Mississippi requires sentencing bodies to unanimously find that the
defendant killed, attempted to kill, intended to kill, intended that a killing take place, or
contemplated that lethal force would be used. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1',-101 (1998).
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IV. Constitutional Analysis of Section 14:42(c)
A. Legislative History
The Louisiana law authorizing the use of the death penalty in
cases of child rape is currently the only one of its kind.135  The
1995 amendment to Section 14:42(c) was introduced into the House
Criminal Justice Committee.'36 Representative Pete Schneider
introduced the legislation because "child rape is such a heinous
crime that those convicted should receive the ultimate penal-
ty--death." '137 Several arguments were advanced in opposition to
the bill and some of the committee members feared that the
legislation was unconstitutional because it violated previous
Supreme Court decisions on rape and the death penalty.'38 In
response to that argument, Schneider said that the composition of
the Court has changed since Coker and there may be a change of
public opinion as well.13 9 Also, Schneider said "we need to listen
to the will of the people, not attorneys and Supreme Court
Justices."'" Legislators also worried that Louisiana's existing
death penalty law would be in jeopardy if the bill became law
because of the possibility that the law could be unequally applied
and, therefore, unconstitutional.41 House Bill 55 drew its criti-
cism outside the legislature from Louisiana's Catholic bishops and
135. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 30.
136. See Joanna Weiss and Ed Anderson, Rape Death Penalty Heads to House Floor, THE
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, April 20, 1995, at A3.
137. Marsha Shuler, House Passes Death Penalty for Child Rape, THE NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, April 27, 1995, at 1B;S. Schneider has said that "the facts show [rapists]
are incurable. They are predators." Weiss and Anderson, supra note 136, at A3.
138. See Weiss and Anderson, supra note 136, at A3. Representative Audrey McCain
argued that the Supreme Court has held the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment
for the crime of rape (referring to the Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977)). See id. McCain then was quoted as saying "I see no point in passing legislation that
we know, before we ever send it anywhere, that it's going to come back to haunt us." Id.
139. See Shuler, supra note 137, at 1B;S.
140. Id.
141. See id.; see also Ed Anderson, Death for Rapists Approved, Castration Provision
Rejected, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, April 27, 1995, at A2. By saying that the
law could be unequally applied, the representative is most likely referring to the fact that
state legislatures narrow the class of death eligible persons so as to minimize the risk of
arbitrary and capricious application. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988). By
adding child rapists to the class of eligible defendants, the legislature may have expanded
that class too much, which could lead to invalidation of Louisiana's capital punishment laws.
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the Louisiana Criminal Defense Bar Association.'42 The Catholic
Bishops opposed the bill on two grounds: first, the church supports
the right to life;143 and second, the death penalty is not a deter-
rent.144 The Louisiana Criminal Defense Bar Association op-
posed the bill on the ground that the new law could encourage
rapists to kill their young victims because the rapist has nothing to
lose and can eliminate the eyewitness. 145  Thus, the death penalty
would eradicate any incentive to keep the child alive.146
Despite these arguments, the Criminal Justice Committee
voted 4-3 to send House Bill 55 to the House floor 147 where the
bill survived two attempts at amendments. 148  The first proposed
amendment was by Representative Adley who tried to add a
provision requiring that convicted rapists be castrated while
awaiting execution.149 The House initially passed the amendment
53-49, but then voted unanimously to delete it from the bill after
Schneider warned that the amendment would endanger the bill's
chance of passage. 150  The second amendment was proposed by
Representative McCain, an initial opponent to the bill.' 5' McCain
proposed a life sentence with castration for child rapists as an
alternative to the death penalty. 52  However, McCain's amend-
ment was defeated by a 27-70 vote.
153
142. See Weiss and Anderson, supra note, 136 at A3; Ed Anderson and Jack Wardlaw,
Death for Child Rapists Goes to Senate Floor, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May
31, 1995, at A8.
143. See Anderson and Wardlaw, supra note, 142, at A8.
144. See Anderson and Wardlaw, supra note 142, at A8. Kirby Ducote, a lobbyist for the
bishops, said, "New Orleans is the murder capital of the country ... [T]he death penalty has
not stopped that." Id.
145. See Weiss and Anderson, supra note 136, at A3; see also Jack Wardlaw, Death
Penalty for Child Rape Gets Final OK, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 6, 1995,
at A4.
146. See Shuler, supra note 137, at 1B;S (quoting Representative Jenkins as saying that
the rapist would be more likely to "get rid of the victim so she could not testify").
147. See Weiss and Anderson, supra note 136, at A3.
148. See Anderson, supra note 141, at A2. Representative Bruneau encouraged lawmak-
ers to approve a "clean bill" dealing only with the death penalty to increase the law's chance
of surviving legal challenges in the federal courts. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See Weiss and Anderson, supra note 136, at A3.
152. See Anderson, supra note 141, at A2. McCain argued that the Supreme Court has
already held that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape
(referring to the Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)). See Weiss and
Anderson supra note 136, at A3.
153. See Anderson supra note 141, at A2.
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House Bill 55 left the House without amendment and went to
the Senate where the bill passed with a vote of 34-1.54 In fact,
the Senate did not even debate before giving final approval to the
legislation.'
B. Analysis of the State Supreme Court's Decision in State v.
Wilson
The Louisiana State Supreme Court supported the state
legislature and held that Section 14:42(c) did not violate the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.'56 The
court based its decision on the following premises: (1) the class of
defendants is sufficiently narrow so as to avoid arbitrary and
capricious application; (2) the death penalty would serve the goal
of retribution and be a deterrent to the commission of this crime;
and (3) the punishment was not excessive.
15 7
1. Arbitrary and Capricious Application-The Louisiana State
Legislature chose to reduce the class of death-eligible persons by
narrowly defining the crimes punishable by death.'58 Under
Section 14:42(c), the class of death-eligible persons is limited to
those who rape children under twelve.'59 The Louisiana court
held that this constituted sufficient narrowing by the legislature. 6 °
The Louisiana legislature has not gone far enough to prevent
arbitrary and capricious application. The statute does not meaning-
fully narrow the definition and, as such, does not really guide the
jury by differentiating between those child rapists who are more
deserving of harsher punishment and those who are not. "It is
generally agreed that punishment should be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal defendant."'' With the
statute as it is now, there is no guarantee that the death penalty
will be imposed only on those child rapists who are the most
culpable.
154. See Shuler supra note 137, at 1B;S.
155. See id.
156. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1070-73 (La. 1996), reh'g denied, NO. 96-KA-
2073, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
157. See id. at 1070-73.
158. See id. at 1071.
159. See id. at 1072.
160. See id.
161. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 817 (1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Furthermore, the court found that the jury was not given
unbridled discretion and, therefore, could not act arbitrarily and
capriciously because (1) the trial is bifurcated with a separate
sentencing hearing; (2) indigent defendants are represented by
"death-certified" attorneys;" (3) the jury must find beyond a
reasonable doubt at least one aggravating factor; 63 (4) the
defendant may present mitigating factors; and (5) there is a
mandatory review of any guilty verdict in a capital case. 6 The
fact that the aggravating circumstance, the age of the child, is also
an element of the crime, was not found to make the statute
unconstitutional. 16 5 The Louisiana court pointed to the United
States Supreme Court's holding that the death penalty was not
invalid even though the only aggravating circumstance found by the
jury was an element of the crime.166
While it is true that an aggravating factor can be an element
of the crime, the aggravating factor must "genuinely narrow the
class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty [of the same crime]."67 Allowing
juries to find the age of the victim as an aggravating factor 68 does
not reduce the risk of arbitrary and capricious application. Within
the group of defendants who rape children under twelve, there will
be a range of moral culpability. One defendant could be charged
with the rape of numerous children, whom the defendant knew to
be under twelve. Another defendant could be charged with raping
one child, whom the defendant thought was fifteen, and who had
consented to the act. 169 Clearly, the first defendant is the most
morally culpable of the two. However, because the only aggravat-
ing factor that needs to be found is the age of the victim, juries are
free to mete out the death penalty to anyone in that group. Thus,
162. A "death certified" attorney is one who is appointed by the Indigent Defender
Board and has adequate experience to effectively represent a defendant facing the death
penalty. See LA. S. Cr. R. XXXI; see also State v. Taylor, 669 So.2d 364, 368 (La. 1996).
163. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West 1996).
164. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1071.
165. See id.
166. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
167. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (emphasis added).
168. Louisiana juries are only required to find one aggravating factor. See LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3.




the legislature has opened the door to arbitrary and capricious
application of the death penalty.
While the concern over arbitrary and capricious application is
typically focused on the procedures of the sentencing, it also
extends to fair application based on race.170 In Furman, his
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated that "it would seem to
be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant
is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race,
religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under
a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.
171
Counsel for Bethley and Wilson argued in his brief to the Supreme
Court that "it is now beyond dispute that the use of the death
penalty for rape, far more than any other crime, is racially
discriminatory.',1 72 All statistical analysis of rape cases since the
1920's have concluded that the race of the defendant and the victim
are consistently and systematically related to the imposition of the
death penalty.173
2. Acceptable Goals of Punishment-The Louisiana Supreme
Court determined that use of the death penalty in cases of child
rape will make measurable contributions towards acceptable goals
of punishment by fulfilling the need for retribution and serving to
deter others from raping children under twelve.1 74  The statute,
according to the Louisiana court, has the potential of drastically
reducing the incidence of child rape, increasing cooperation by rape
victims, and improving the level of confidence people have in the
ability of the law to maintain order.
1 75
Punishing child rape with the death penalty will not properly
serve the goals of retribution or deterrence. First, Section 14:42(c)
has no intent requirement, but is a strict liability statute.176 In
Enmund, the Court stated that, "[w]e are quite uncon-
vinced ... that the threat that the death penalty will be imposed
for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no
170. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (per curiam).
171. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
172. Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425, brief accompanying petition for cert. (No. 96-
3384) at 35; cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
173. See MARQUART, J., EKLAND-OLSON, S., AND SORENSEN, J., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR
AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990, 100 (1954).
174. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1073 (La. 1996).
175. See id.
176. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(c) (West 1996).
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intention or purpose that life will be taken." '77 Section 14:42(c)
does not measurably contribute to the goal of deterrence if the
criminals convicted under it did not have any pre-meditated intent.
Second, instead of increasing cooperation by rape victims, this
statute could actually deter victims from reporting the crime. Since
most incidences of child rape are by family members17 the child
could be easily deterred from reporting the incident if told by the
attacker that the child would be responsible for the attacker's
death. Also, death penalty litigation greatly intensifies the fear,
stress, and guilt for young victims.179 According to the Louisiana
Foundation Against Sexual Assault 8 ' requiring a child to testify
is extremely harmful to the child's psychological well-being. 8 1  If
capital punishment is authorized in cases of child rape, this effect
will be increased because the child will have to testify more
often.182 There will be more delays in bringing the case to trial
and such delays will prolong the period of stress and anxiety that
the child must endure.'83  In addition, the increased media
attention which usually accompanies capital cases will most likely
increase the child's feelings of pressure, guilt and fear."8 Many
victims could shy away from this ordeal and, as a result, a number
of child rape cases will go unreported and those children will not
get the help they need.
Third, instead of deterring child rape, this statute has the
potential to increase the occurrence of child rape and murder. The
rapist has no incentive to keep the child alive. The victim is usually
the only witness to the crime of rape. If the child lives, there is an
eyewitness and the rapist faces the death penalty. If the child dies,
the rapist faces the same penalty, but,there is no eyewitness so the
177. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
178. See Amici Curiae Brief for, inter alia, The Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual
Assault, the National Association of Social Workers, the Louisiana chapter of the National
Organization of Women, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana, at 10, State
v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief].
179. See id.
180. The Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault is a victims' rights group.
181. See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 178.
182. See id. The number of times the child has to testify increases in death penalty cases
because (1) in capital cases in Louisiana, defendants are not permitted to enter a plea of
guilty unless there is a plea bargain; (2) death penalty cases generally have more evidentiary
hearings; and (3) death penalty trials are bifurcated proceedings which means the child must





rapist has a better chance of escaping conviction. Essentially, this
statute creates an incentive to kill.
Finally, retributive justice requires the punishment to be
directly related to the defendant's individual culpability.1 85 Under
Section 14:42(c), there is a possibility that a jury could give a death
sentence to a rapist who reasonably overestimated the child's age.
Using death to punish a crime with no element of intent goes
beyond acceptable boundaries of retribution because the sentence
may not always be based on an individualized assessment of the
defendant's blameworthiness. A criminal justice system that allows
this to happen is not measurably contributing to retribution.
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment-The Louisiana Supreme
Court held that death is not an excessive penalty for the crime of
child rape. 86 In reaching this decision, the court first looked to
the Louisiana legislature as evidence of contemporary standards of
decency. 87  According to the court, children cannot protect
themselves, but are a class of citizens needing special protec-
tion." Therefore, the state has the responsibility and duty of
protecting its children. 189  The Louisiana State Legislature con-
cluded that the rape of a child is like no other crime-"the damage
a child suffers because of a rape is devastating to both the child
and the community"lg°-and prescribed the death penalty as a
possible punishment.191  The state supreme court looked to
Section 14:42(c) as evidence of the "standards of decency" in
Louisiana, and deferred to the legislature as allowed under Gregg
v. Georgia."9
185. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987); see also State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d
630, 653 (Utah 1997). See generally California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
186. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996).




191. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1067.
192. See id. The Court has acknowledged that the legislature is not obligated to choose
the least severe punishment available and that legislative enactments carry a presumption of
constitutionality under the state and federal Constitution. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 175 (1976). The party- challenging the statute has a heavy burden because the
constitutional test-whether the punishment is excessive or inhumane-is intertwined with
an assessment of contemporary standards, and the legislature provides objective evidence of
such standards. See id. Louisiana's legislature made a determination, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court decided that the defendants challenging the statute did not meet the burden
of proving the law unconstitutional. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1067.
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The Louisiana court is correct in looking to the state legisla-
ture as objective evidence of contemporary standards of decen-
cy.'93 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
said that "the clearest and most reliable evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislators." '194
However, in looking at the legislatures, the court should consider
not only Louisiana's legislature, but the legislatures of the other
forty-nine states as well.195 Only then can the court determine
whether there is a "national consensus" in favor of capital punish-
ment for child rape.
Louisiana is currently the only state with a death penalty
statute for child rape. 96 In Coker, the Court determined that the
three states authorizing capital punishment for the rape of an adult
woman did not indicate that contemporary standards of decency
favored use of the death penalty to punish rape."9 In Enmund,
the Court said that the conduct of eight states was constitutionally
insufficient evidence of contemporary standards of decency.1 98 In
Penry, the Court held that fourteen state statutes prohibiting the
execution of the mentally retarded did not establish a national
consensus. 1
99
In light of these decisions, the legislative activity of one state
clearly is not sufficient evidence of contemporary standards of
decency; there is no "national consensus." There have been hints
of a following in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Montana, but those
states could not even get the legislation through their own state
legislatures. 2°° If the conduct of eight states was constitutionally
insufficient evidence of contemporary standards of decency in
Enmund, one state statute and three other attempts to pass
legislation will hardly suffice.2°'
The Louisiana court pointed out that after the Supreme
Court's decision in Furman, three states passed statutes instituting
193. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989)
("First among the objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction
are statutes passed by society's elected representatives.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
195. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370.
196. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1068.
197. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 585-96 (1977).
198. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982).
199. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989).
200. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
201. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792.
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the death penalty for rape when the victim was a child.2 °2 Even
though those statutes have all since been invalidated for differing
reasons discussed above, the Louisiana court reasoned that the
simple fact that these statutes were enacted suggested "the
beginning of a trend and public opinion favoring such penalties-an
evolution of a standard ....
The court's theory fails for two reasons. First, when looking
to the acts of legislatures, the court should look to the current acts
of legislatures. What a state legislature did nine years ago in
Mississippi indicates nothing about contemporary standards of
decency. Second, even if historical support is considered, it does
not establish a national consensus. Since 1972, only four states
have passed such legislation.21 Of those four states, only Louisi-
ana's statute has been upheld in the courts.
20 5
The state supreme court also concluded that the fact that
Louisiana is the first state to impose the death penalty for the rape
of a child cannot be deemed determinative of the constitutional
status of the statute.2' A law is not unconstitutional simply
because a state is the first to implement it.2°  "If no state could
pass a law without other states passing the same or similar law, new
laws could never be passed. ''208  The court suggested that other
states could be waiting in the wings, watching Louisiana's struggle
to ensure constitutionality before enacting their own statute.2 9
While it is true that a state statute is not unconstitutional
merely for being the first of its kind, the available evidence does
not paint a picture of states anxiously waiting for the go-ahead to
pass new death penalty legislation. In fact, quite the opposite is
happening. The information available does not indicate a national
consensus. Today, there is not one inmate on death row in the
202. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1068 (La. 1996), reh'g denied, No. 96-KA-2073,
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
203. Id.
204. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 30. Those four states are Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Tennessee. See id.
205. Mississippi's statute was invalidated in Leatherwood v. State, 548 So.2d 389 (Miss.
1989); Florida's statute was invalidated in Buford v. State, 403 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982), and Tennessee's statute was invalidated in Collins v. State, 550
S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977).
206. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1068.
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United States for raping a child.21° The last time a person was
executed for the crime of rape was in 1964.2" State legislators in
Montana, Georgia, and Pennsylvania have tried to pass similar
death penalty legislation, but have been unsuccessful. In the
last year, attempts to expand the death penalty were blocked in
Illinois, Washington, California, and Utah.213  Further, other
states are trying to deal with the problem of sexual crimes against
children, but are doing so in more progressive and humane ways.
For example, in Kansas, the state legislature enacted the Sexually
Violent Predator Act that provides for involuntary civil commit-
ment of persons who are convicted or charged with a "sexually
violent offense" and who suffer from a "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder" that makes them "likely to engage in...
predatory acts of sexual violence."2 4 This solution offers public
safety and is more humane than the death penalty.
The Louisiana Supreme Court also determined that the death
penalty is not disproportionate to the crime of child rape.
215
"[G]iven the appalling nature of the crime, the severity of harm
inflicted upon the victim, and the harm imposed upon society, the
death penalty is not an excessive penalty for the crime of rape
when the victim is a child under the age of twelve years old.
'216
Bethley and Wilson, the men charged with child rape under
Section 14:42(c), argued that the death penalty is excessive when
the crime committed does not result in a death.1 7 In response,
the Louisiana court looked to Edmund, in which the Supreme
Court held that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for a
robber who does not take a human life.218 In Edmund, the Court
looked at the conduct of the defendant, who aided and abetted a
robbery, in determining the appropriateness of the punishment.219
210. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 598 (1994).
211. See id.
212. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 30.
213. See Willing, supra note 3.
214. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1996); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct.
2072 (1997). See generally John Kip Cornwall, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible
Civil Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1269 (1996).
215. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996), reh'g denied, NO. 96-KA-2073,
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997).
216. Id.
217. See id. at 1069.
218. See id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
219. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-801.
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Section 14:42(c) prescribes a punishment for someone who rapes
a child under the age of twelve.22° That conduct, according to the
state legislature, is a grievous affront to humanity deserving of the
death penalty.221 Furthermore, in Edmund, four justices dissented
finding that the death penalty is permissible in those situations in
which the defendant has neither killed not intended to kill
anyone.222 The Louisiana court then discussed the holding in
Tison in which the United States Supreme Court held that the
death penalty is not disproportionate when the defendant has
played a major role in the felony that resulted in murder and the
defendant's state of mind was one of reckless indifference to
human life.2'
The Louisiana court interpreted these two cases to mean that
the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for "minor
crimes., 24 The Louisiana court agreed with the state legislature
that the crime of child rape is so injurious to the victim and
community that the death penalty is not disproportionate in
relation to the crime.25 Therefore, the court held that child rape
is not a minor crime and the death penalty is not an excessive
punishment.
226
A punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment when it is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime."227  Anytime death is a punishment for a crime not
involving death, it is disproportionate. As counsel for the appellant
in Gregg said:
Death is factually different. Death is final. Death is irremedi-
able. Death is unknowable; it goes beyond this world ....
Death is different because even if exactly the same discretionary
procedures are used to decide issues of five years versus ten
220. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(c) (West 1996).
221. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996).
222. See id.; see also Enmund, 458 U.S. 782.
223. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1070.
224. See id.
225. See id. The Court had previously recognized that both the injury to the victim and
the resulting public injury could possibly be considered in measuring the degree of harm
caused by a crime. See Coker v. Georgia 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
226. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1070.
227. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
[Vol. 102:3
DEVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
years, or life versus death, the result will be more arbitrary on
the life or death choice.2"
The reasoning in Enmund, Tison and Coker supports the
conclusion that death is a disproportionate penalty for the crime of
rape. First, the Louisiana court was wrong to dismiss the impor-
tance of Enmund as holding only that a "minor" crime cannot be
punished by death.229 In Enmund, the Court held that capital
punishment is disproportionate for the felony murderer who does
not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place.230
Child rape, while horrible and demeaning, does not necessarily
include an intent to kill. Furthermore, in Tison, the defendant
actively participated in a felony that resulted in murder.231 The
child rapist does not actively participate in murder and, as such,
does not exhibit a reckless indifference to human life-the standard
that the Court in Tison said could support the use of the death
penalty in a non-homicide.
2 32
More important than the impact of Enmund and Tison,
however, is the Court's holding in Coker, in which the Court settled
the issue of whether homicide and rape are equal. The very
essence of the Court's reasoning in Coker is that there is a lesser
amount of harm produced by rape. The Court's message is clear
that the death penalty should only be used for crimes involving the
death of a victim: "We have the abiding conviction that the death
penalty, which is unique in its severity and irrevocability, is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human
life."
233
The Louisiana legislature and Louisiana Supreme Court have
decided that the rape of a child is different than the rape of an
adult, and that the Court's reasoning in Coker does not apply.
However, in 1981, the Florida Supreme Court looked at the very
same question and held the opposite-that the Coker decision is
228. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955, 233 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton, eds. 1st. ed. 1993).
229. See Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1070.
230. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
231. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. at 137, 158 (1987). ("Each Petitioner was actively
involved in every element of the kidnapping-robbery and was physically present during the
entire sequence of criminal activity .... ").
232. See id.
233. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
187 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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controlling for rape of a child as well as for rape of an adult.234
The Florida Court stated that "[t]he reasoning of the justices in
Coker v. Georgia compels us to hold that a sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of
sexual assault and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment
as cruel and unusual punishment., 235  The Florida court recog-
nized that while child rape is a heinous and unthinkable crime, it
is not so far removed from rape of an adult woman as to warrant
the death penalty.
V. Conclusion
Children need special protection from society. They are more
vulnerable and trusting, and need security and support to grow into
adults. The Louisiana legislature was sincere in its efforts to
protect its children. However, this protection cannot be accom-
plished in a manner that is contrary to the Constitution. The use
of capital punishment in cases of child rape goes too far and
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.
In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has narrowed the
death penalty so that it is understood to be a life-for-life operation.
By allowing Louisiana to punish child rapists with the death
penalty, the Supreme Court would be unraveling years of effort to
curtail the use of capital punishment. The door would be open for
death penalty legislation for any crime that society finds morally
reprehensible. Where will we draw the line if not at the loss of life
by a victim? Because the death penalty is the ultimate sanction our
criminal justice system provides, it should be reserved for those
whose crime involves the unjustified taking of a human life, not
child rape.
Emily Marie Moeller
234. See Buford v. State, 403 So.2d 943, 951 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163
(1982).
235. Id. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari for the Florida case, leaving
open two questions: (1) is the rape of a child a fundamentally different crime than the rape
of an adult, and (2) is death a disproportionate crime for the rape of a child?
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